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Abstract
The authors examine the impact of multinational enterprises (MNEs) on exchange rate pass-
through in an environment where an MNE engages in Cournot (quantity) competition with
domestic and foreign rivals. The MNE differs from its competitors because it has a lower marginal
cost as a result of increased efﬁciency, and economies of scope as a result of operating in two
markets. An MNE can also choose to locate its production for the foreign market domestically (in
the location of the MNE’s parent), or in the foreign country (the location of the subsidiary). When
it locates all its production domestically, it engages in intraﬁrm trade (IT) in ﬁnal goods.
Otherwise, it is said to engage in international production (IP). Consistent with other studies on
exchange rate pass-through under imperfect competition, the authors’ analysis shows that
exchange rate pass-through into domestic and foreign prices is incomplete. Moreover, the
presence of an MNE increases the sensitivity of domestic market prices, and reduces the
sensitivity of foreign market prices, to exchange rate movements, relative to arm’s-length trade.
Furthermore, IT domestic and foreign prices are more sensitive to exchange rate movements than
their IP counterparts, and react in the opposite direction. The authors’ results indicate that it is
important to distinguish between the domestic and the foreign market when looking at the
sensitivity of prices and their direction of change. This could potentially explain why some
empirical studies ﬁnd IT prices more sensitive to exchange rate movements and others ﬁnd them
less sensitive.
JEL classiﬁcation: F23, L16
Bank classiﬁcation: Economic models; Exchange rates; Market structure and pricing
Résumé
Les auteures étudient les effets de l’existence de multinationales sur le degré de transmission des
mouvements de change aux prix dans un modèle de concurrence par les quantités (ou concurrence
à la Cournot) où une multinationale affronte des rivales à la fois sur son marché intérieur et sur un
marché extérieur. Cette multinationale se distingue de ses concurrentes par une plus grande
efﬁcience, qui lui vaut un coût marginal plus bas, et par des économies de gamme, qu’elle doit à
sa présence sur deux marchés. Outre ces atouts, la multinationale peut décider de centraliser sa
production pour le marché extérieur dans le pays de domiciliation de sa société-mère ou de la
délocaliser à l’étranger, sur le territoire de sa ﬁliale. Quand toute l’activité de production
s’effectue sur le territoire de la société-mère, on dit qu’il y a commerce intra-entreprises de biens
ﬁnaux; dans le cas contraire, on parlera de production internationale. Comme chez d’autresvi
chercheurs, l’analyse des auteures montre que les variations de change ne se répercutent pas
intégralement sur les prix intérieurs et extérieurs en contexte de concurrence imparfaite. Qui plus
est, comparativement à des conditions de pleine concurrence, l’existence d’une multinationale
rend les prix intérieurs plus sensibles aux ﬂuctuations du taux de change, et les prix à l’étranger
moins sensibles. De surcroît, les prix sur les deux marchés réagissent davantage aux mouvements
de change dans le cas du commerce intra-entreprises que dans celui de la production
internationale, mais ils évoluent en sens opposé. Les auteures en concluent qu’il est important
pour quiconque étudie la sensibilité des prix et le sens de leurs variations de veiller à différencier
les marchés intérieur et extérieur. Cette distinction pourrait expliquer pourquoi les prix observés
dans le cas du commerce intra-entreprises sont plus sensibles selon certaines études empiriques et
moins selon d’autres.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F23, L16
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Taux de change; Structure de marché et ﬁxa-
tion des prix1. Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) play an important role in international trade. Recently,
MNEs’ pricing behaviour has attracted a lot of attention from both policy-makers and re-
searchers. To the extent that MNEs are diﬀerent from other ﬁrms, one would expect that
their trade and pricing patterns would also be diﬀerent. A few empirical studies have at-
tempted to compare the responsiveness of MNEs’ trade prices with arm’s-length trade (AT)
prices, but no theoretical analyses of this exist.1 In this paper, we develop a model of an
MNE and attempt to shed some light on the issue of the sensitivity of MNEs’ trade prices
to exchange rate movements. In particular, we examine how the presence of an MNE aﬀects
the exchange rate pass-through relative to AT, and how the MNE’s location of production
matters for exchange rate pass-through.
Exchange rate pass-through into consumer prices has fallen considerably in Canada and
other industrialized countries over the past two decades. One potential explanation for this
decline is the increasing importance of intraﬁrm trade (IT).2 The existing evidence shows
that MNEs’ exports have increasingly shifted away from AT towards IT (Rangan, 2001).
The empirical evidence, otherwise limited, on the sensitivity of IT prices to exchange rate
pass-through is somewhat mixed. For example, Clausing (2001) ﬁnds that IT prices are more
sensitive to exhange rate movements than AT prices. Rangan and Lawrence (1999) also show
that, relative to AT, imports (quantities) to the United States by MNEs exhibit both stronger
and faster responses to exchange rate changes, which the authors attribute to informational
advantages arising from multinational operations. However, Pain (2002) ﬁnds the opposite
for the United Kingdom: IT prices are less sensitive to exchange rate movements than AT
prices.
MNEs can organize their production in a number of diﬀerent ways. An MNE can set
up production at one location and transfer ﬁnished goods among its diﬀerent branches.
This is the case of IT. An MNE can also undertake production locally for sale in the local
market. We refer to this scenario as international production (IP). According to UNCTAD
1In arm’s-length trade, an exporter sells a product to a local ﬁrm that is responsible for the retailing of
that product. The exporter has no access to the local market.
2Other possible explanations for the decline of the exchange rate pass-through suggested in the literature
are: (i) the transition to a low-inﬂation environment in industrialized countries; (ii) substitution by consumers
to lower-priced items, substitution by retailers to lower-cost suppliers, and greater productivity improvements
by retailers during periods of depreciation of the national currency; (iii) the shift in the composition of imports
in industrialized countries towards sectors with lower pass-through. A Canadian study by Lapham (2004)
shows that both lower inﬂation and restructuring in the retail sector explain the observed lower pass-through
to consumer prices in Canada.
11998-2004 reports, IP has increased substantially in the past decade. Finally, an MNE
can establish diﬀerent stages of production in diﬀerent locations and this will entail IT in
intermediate products. We do not examine this case because we do not model intermediate
production in this paper.3 Instead, we focus on an MNE that produces a ﬁnal good for two
locations, domestic and foreign, using local resources at a constant input price at the point
of production. The MNE competes with local producers in both markets, but is able to
treat the domestic and foreign markets as completely segmented. We consider two diﬀerent
production scenarios: (i) IT under which production is undertaken at the location of the
MNE’s parent company (resulting in trade of the ﬁnal good between the two countries), and
(ii) IP in which production takes place locally in the location of sales.
The distinguishing features of our model of MNE are: (i) economies of scope or comple-
mentarity in the production of outputs, (ii) competition in both markets, and (iii) diﬀerential
taxation of MNE proﬁts in the two countries.
The notion of economies of scope is related to intangibles such as research and develop-
ment (R&D), advertising, marketing, distribution, and management services that an MNE
is able to share across plants, avoiding duplication of such expenditures (Markusen, 1984).
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005) provide empirical evidence of a complementary relationship
between foreign and domestic investment for U.S. MNEs. Their study implies that MNEs
combine home production with foreign production to generate a ﬁnal product at a lower cost
than would be possible with production in just one country.
In our model, the MNE competes in quantity (Cournot competition) with local producers
in both markets. This is a departure from the MNE literature in which it is assumed that the
MNE is a monopolist in both the domestic and the foreign markets. Following a stream of the
industrial organization pricing-to-market literature, we choose to work under the assumption
of quantity (Cournot) competition rather than that of price (Bertrand) competition (Lapham,
2004; Dornbusch, 1987; Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter, 1996; Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston,
2002).
As is common in the MNE literature, the MNE in our model is subject to diﬀerential
taxation of proﬁts in the two countries in which it operates. In this context, cost assignment
rules (also referred to as transfer pricing rules) become particularly important. The common
cost-splitting rule we employ breaks up the cost into two: the stand-alone cost the MNE
3An increasing proportion of IT by MNEs is accounted for by intermediate inputs, and we hope to examine
intermediate production in future research.
2incurs in the case where it produces only for the domestic market, and the incremental cost
the MNE incurs when producing for the foreign market as well. This rule is realistic and has
been used in other studies of MNEs, such as Calzolari and Scarpa (2004) and Eden (1998).
However, contrary to other MNE papers that focus on the regulation of MNEs by means of
taxation, in our paper we assume that proﬁt taxes are exogenous.4 We incorporate taxes in
our analysis to investigate the eﬀects of these on the sensitivity of prices with respect to the
exchange rate. There exists substantial evidence of the relationship between countries’ tax
rates and prices of intraﬁrm transactions. One such study is Clausing (2003), which shows
that as the tax rates of the destination and origin countries are lower, U.S. intraﬁrm export
prices are lower and U.S. intraﬁrm import prices are higher. It is therefore important to
include taxes in any analysis of MNEs’ pricing behaviour.
Our paper combines two strands of literature: the MNE literature and the literature on
exchange rate pass-through. To our knowledge, our analysis is novel and no other analytical
studies of the eﬀect of MNEs’ pricing behaviour on exchange rate pass-through exist. The
only related paper that we came across is Hegji (2003). Hegji develops a model in which
an MNE produces locally and exports some of the output to a foreign subsidiary, which
incurs additional costs. This framework allows Hegji to derive simple expressions for the
exchange rate pass-through in terms of elasticities of demand and marginal costs. Our paper
builds on Hegji’s by introducing a rationale for the existence of MNEs (economies of scope),
competition in both markets, and considers both IT and IP as alternative means of delivering
goods and services.
Consistent with other studies on exchange rate pass-through under imperfect competi-
tion, our analysis shows that exchange rate pass-through into domestic and foreign prices is
incomplete. Moreover, the presence of an MNE increases the sensitivity of domestic market
prices, and reduces the sensitivity of foreign market prices, to exchange rate movements,
relative to AT. Furthermore, IT domestic and foreign prices are more sensitive to exchange
rate movements than their IP counterparts, and react in the opposite direction.
Our results indicate that it is important to distinguish between the domestic market
(the location of the MNE’s parent) and the foreign market (the location of the subsidiary)
when looking at the sensitivity of prices and their direction of change. This could potentially
explain why some empirical studies ﬁnd IT prices more sensitive to exchange rate movements
and others ﬁnd them less sensitive. While our approach does not allow us to directly link the
4The literature on the regulation of MNEs is extensive. See, for example, Calzolari and Scarpa (2004),
Calzolari (2004), Bond and Gresik (1996), Dasgupta and Sengupta (1995), and Gresik and Nelson (1994).
3observed decline in exchange rate pass-through to the increasing importance of IT, it does
allow us to shed some light on how the presence of an MNE and its location of production
can aﬀect exchange rate pass-through compared with AT.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model, and in subsec-
tion 2.1 we derive the equilibrium outputs and exchange rate pass-through in both markets.
In subsection 2.2, we compare outputs and exchange rate pass-through across cases. In
section 3 we oﬀer some conclusions.
2. The Model
In this model, we consider an MNE that sells its products in two locations, domestic (where
its parent company is located) and foreign. It supplies outputs yd to its domestic market and
yf to its foreign market. In each of these markets, it faces Cournot competition from local
ﬁrms that produce homogeneous products. We assume that there are n identical local ﬁrms
in the domestic market, each of which supplies the quantity y−d, and m identical local ﬁrms
in the foreign market, each of which supplies the quantity y−f. We allow the MNE to diﬀer
from its local competitors in its production technology, and we assume that the domestic and
foreign markets are segmented; that is, demands are independent.
We consider two diﬀerent cases for the location of production by the MNE: IT and IP.
In the IT case, the MNE produces yd + yf in its domestic (parent company) location and
transfers yf to its foreign aﬃliate for sale in the foreign market. In the IP case, the MNE
produces yd domestically and yf through its foreign aﬃliate in its foreign location. The
MNE’s production technology is summarized by a minimum cost function, C(ε,yd,yf,β),
where ε ∈ {e,1} and the exchange rate, e, is the price of the domestic currency divided by the
price of foreign currency. For simplicity, we assume the domestic currency as the numeraire
and express the MNE’s proﬁt and cost functions in terms of the domestic currency. β is an
eﬃciency parameter, which we assume is observable to the MNE and its competitors in both
the domestic and foreign markets.
The MNE’s cost function satisﬁes the following properties: Cyi > 0, Cβ > 0, Cβyi ≥ 0,
Cyiyi ≤ 0, and Cyiyj = ψ < 0, a constant, for i 6= j. For ε = e, we also assume that Ce > 0,
Ceyd = 0, and Ceyf > 0. The assumption ψ < 0 reﬂects the fact that there are economies
of scope for the MNE. That is, yd and yf are complements in production. Complementarity
can arise when the MNE uses common inputs such as R&D, brand name, and reputation.
4Finally, where results are clearer with speciﬁed functional forms, we assume that the cost
function takes the following functional form:
C(ε,yd,yf,β) = β(yd + εyf) + ψydyf, (1)
which satisﬁes all the required restrictions. ε = 1 corresponds to the case of IT (since
this indicates that the cost of producing yf is incurred in domestic currency) and ε = e
corresponds to the case of IP. The AT case corresponds to ψ = 0 and ε = 1. This is the case
of a purely domestic exporter that produces in its domestic location and exports its output
to the foreign market.
The cost assignment rule we introduce breaks up the common cost into two components.
The ﬁrst component is the stand-alone cost (SAC), and it is deﬁned as the cost the MNE
incurs if it produces for the domestic market alone, that is, yf = 0:
SAC(ε,yd,0,β) = βyd. (2)
The second component is the incremental cost (IC), and it is the additional cost the MNE
incurs if it produces for the foreign market as well. The incremental cost is thus:
IC(ε,yd,yf,β) = C(ε,yd,yf,β) − SAC(ε,yd,0,β) = βεyf + ψydyf. (3)
The incremental cost has two terms. The ﬁrst term, βεyf, is positive, and the second
term, ψydyf, is negative, since ψ < 0, reﬂecting the economies-of-scope (or production-
complementarity) assumption. In the case of AT, ψ = 0 and ε = 1, so the foreign cost for a
domestic exporter is just βyf > 0. The MNE, however, has economies of scope and is able
to produce at a lower foreign cost than the domestic exporter.
For simplicity, we assume that the MNE’s competitors—domestic and foreign—have con-
stant marginal costs of production equal to 1. We also assume that the MNE is more eﬃcient
than its competitors; that is, β ≤ 1. This is a reasonable assumption given the existing em-
pirical evidence that exporters and, a fortiori, MNEs are more eﬃcient than purely domestic
ﬁrms.5
Market conditions in the domestic and foreign markets are given by inverse demand
functions. We assume linear demands and allow the two markets to diﬀer along a scale
5See, for example, Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1997a,b,c), Richardson and Rindal (1995), Bernard and
Wagner (1997), Bernard, Jensen, and Wagner (1997), and Aw and Hwang (1995).
5(intercept) and an elasticity (slope) component. The inverse demand function in the domestic
market is given by Pd = a − bYd, where Yd = yd + ny−d is total output, and n is the number
of ﬁrms operating in d, each producing output y−d. Similarly, the inverse demand function
in f is Pf = h − kYf, where Yf = yf + my−f is total output, and m is the number of ﬁrms
operating in f, each producing output y−f. We assume that a > 1 and h > 1, which is
necessary for the existence of local ﬁrms with marginal cost of production equal to 1.
The MNE is subject to proﬁt taxes, td and tf, in the domestic and foreign market,
respectively.
The MNE is risk neutral and its objective is to choose quantities, yd and yf, to maximize
global proﬁts:
Π(ε,yd,yf,β) = (1 − td)(Pdyd − SAC) + (1 − tf)(ePfyf − IC)
= [(1 − td)Pdyd + (1 − tf)ePfyf] − [(1 − td)SAC + (1 − tf)IC].
(4)
The terms in the ﬁrst square brackets represent the after-tax revenue and the terms in the
second square brackets represent the after-tax cost of the MNE.
The MNE’s competitors in the domestic market simultaneously choose y−d to maximize
proﬁts:
(Pd − 1)y−d, (5)
and its competitors in the foreign market simultaneously choose y−f to maximize proﬁts:
(Pf − 1)y−f. (6)
2.1 Equilibrium output and exchange rate pass-through
The MNE simultaneously chooses yd and yf to maximize global proﬁts, taking as given
the output levels, y−d and y−f, chosen by the domestic and foreign competitors. Assuming
interior solutions, we have two ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the MNE’s problem,




dyd + Pd) = (1 − td)SACyd + (1 − tf)ICyd, (7)
eP
0
fyf + ePf = ICyf, (8)
P
0
dy−d + Pd = 1, (9)
P
0
fy−f + Pf = 1. (10)
For future reference, it is useful to have a closer look at the MNE’s ﬁrst-order conditions (7)
and (8). The left-hand side in (7) is the MNE’s after-tax marginal revenue with respect to
yd, and the right-hand side is the MNE’s after-tax marginal cost with respect to yd. Both
domestic and foreign taxes aﬀect the MNE’s marginal cost of domestic output, since the
cost assignment rule that breaks up total cost into the stand-alone cost and incremental cost
does not take into account production complementarities, in the sense that foreign output
decreases the marginal cost of domestic output. It is this economies-of-scope eﬀect that
results in foreign taxes entering into the MNE’s ﬁrst-order condition for domestic output.
On the other hand, both the marginal revenue and marginal cost of foreign output are reduced
by (1 − tf), and this drops out of the ﬁrst-order condition for foreign output, which is why
taxes do not inﬂuence the MNE’s equilibrium choice of foreign output directly (it does so
only indirectly through changes in domestic output).
The solution to the Cournot games in the domestic and foreign market is obtained by
solving equations (7)–(10) simultaneously. The functional forms also allow us to derive the
expressions for competitors’ outputs, total market outputs, and market prices as functions
of the MNE’s (or arm’s-length exporter’s) outputs, which we present in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Equilibrium quantities, prices, and demand elasticities, expressed in terms of the
MNE’s quantities, yd and yf, are given by
y−d =
a − 1 − byd
b(n + 1)
, y−f =

















n + a − byd
n + 1
, Pf =
m + h − kyf
m + 1
. (13)
7Proof: The proof is relegated to Appendix A. Q.E.D.
We denote by EPi,e = ∂(ln Pi)/∂(ln e) the exchange rate pass-through into market i prices,
for i = d,f. Proposition 1 gives the general expressions for the pass-through elasticities.
Proposition 1 The exchange rate pass-through into foreign and domestic prices is:
EPi,e = Eyi,e · ηPi,yi , i ∈ {d,f} (14)
where Eyi,e = −∂(ln yi)/∂(ln e) is the elasticity of the MNE’s output in country i with
respect to the exchange rate, ηPi,yi = −∂(ln Pi)/∂(ln yi) is the elasticity of market demand
i, i ∈ {d,f} with respect to the MNE’s output in market i.6
Proof: The proof is relegated to Appendix B. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 shows the exchange rate pass-through mechanism by breaking it down into
two factors. First, a change in the exchange rate aﬀects the MNE’s outputs. Second, the
change in outputs aﬀects the elasticity of market demand with respect to the MNE’s outputs.
In the pricing-to-market literature, the exchange rate pass-through is typically expressed
in terms of markups over marginal costs. We can also express the exchange rate pass-through
elasticities as a function of ﬁrms’ cost elasticities with respect to the exchange rate, and show
that exchange rate pass-through is proportional to the elasticity of marginal cost with respect
to the exchange rate:
EPd,e =
(1 − tf)/(1 − td)Cyd












6The elasticity of the market demand i, i ∈ {d,f} with respect to the MNE’s output in market i is



















kyf + m(h − 1)
ηf,
where ηi = ∂(ln Pi)/∂(ln Yi), i = d,f.
8With some manipulation, we can derive the expressions in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The price elasticities with respect to the MNE’s outputs are:
ηPd,yd =
byd




h + m − kyf
> 0. (18)
Proof: The proof is relegated to Appendix C. Q.E.D.
Due to economies of scope in the MNE’s cost function (ψ 6= 0), the price elasticities of
the MNE’s domestic and foreign output are related. Lemma 3 gives the relationship between
the price elasticities of the MNE’s domestic and foreign output.































where j ∈ {AT,IT,IP}, and Iε is an indicator function equal to one for ε = 1 and zero for
ε = e.
Proof: The proof is relegated to Appendix D. Q.E.D.
Lemmas 2 and 3 allow us to predict that the MNE changes the quantities it supplies to
both the domestic and foreign market in the same direction in response to an exchange rate
shock. Consequently, prices in both markets move in the same direction when an MNE is
present. Under AT, however, domestic market prices are invariant to exchange rate move-
ments. These results are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The following is true:
(i) Ej
yd,e and Ej





Pf,e have the same sign, for ψ < 0, j ∈ {IT,IP}.
(iii) EAT
Pd,e = 0 and EAT
Pf,e < 0.
Lemma 3 implies that, for ψ < 0, Ej
yd,e and Ej
yf,e, j ∈ {IT,IP} has the same sign. Since
elasticities ηPi,yi are positive by deﬁnition, Lemmas 2 and 3 together imply that the exchange
rate pass-through into domestic and foreign prices also has the same sign. We can also see
from Lemma 3 that, under AT, which corresponds to ψ = 0 and ε = 1, the exporter’s output,
yd, is invariant to the exchange rate; that is, EAT
yd,e = 0, and EAT
yf,e < 0. This implies that
the exchange rate pass-through into domestic and foreign prices is EAT
Pd,e = 0 and EAT
Pf,e < 0,
respectively.




f, we obtain Proposition 3.














for j ∈ {AT,IT,IP}, where D ≡ (1−td)ekb(n+2)(m+2)−(1−tf)ψ2(n+1)(m+1) > 0.7
We can easily show that y
j
d < (a + n)/2b and y
j
f < (h + m)/2k, which implies that
ηPi,yi < 1, for i ∈ {d,f}.
For future reference, it is useful to obtain the comparative statics properties of the equi-




f. They are summarized in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 The MNE’s output, y
j
i, i ∈ {d,f}, j ∈ {AT,IT,IP}, is increasing in a, h, n, m,
7See Appendix E for a proof and expressions for y−i, Yi, Y−i, Pi, and P−i, for i ∈ {d,f}.




























































To understand the intuition behind these comparative statics results, we rewrite the MNE’s
ﬁrst-order conditions in terms of its own outputs for the domestic and foreign markets (that
is, we substitute in the reaction functions of its domestic and foreign competitors) as follows:
(1 − td)












= βε + ψy
j
d, (28)
for j ∈ {IT,IP}. The marginal revenue is on the left-hand side and the marginal cost is on
the right-hand side. Notice that, while marginal revenue functions are independent across
markets, marginal cost functions are not for the MNE (ψ < 0).
The comparative statics results in Lemma 4 are not surprising, with the exception of
those with respect to the tax rates, td and tf. As expected, the MNE’s domestic and foreign
output increases with market size, decreases with the elasticity of demand, and increases
with competition in the two markets. An increase in the MNE’s eﬃciency (that is, lower
β) increases output levels in the two markets. The output levels are also increasing in the




The more surprising result is that domestic and foreign taxes have opposite eﬀects on the
MNE’s output levels in both markets. An increase in the domestic tax rate, td, reduces both
the marginal revenue on the left-hand side of (27) and the marginal cost on the right-hand
side of (27). The MNE’s ﬁrst-order condition for its foreign market output is unaﬀected by a
change in td. The net eﬀect of the reduction in marginal revenue and marginal cost of domestic
11output production is to increase domestic output, because the eﬀect on marginal cost, given
by β, is greater than the eﬀect on marginal revenue, (n+a−b(n+2)y
j
d)/(n+1) = (1−ηPd,yd)Pd.
To see why this is so, consider a restatement of (27): (1−td)[(1 − ηPd,yd)Pd − β]−(1−tf)ψ =
0. Since the second term on the left-hand side is positive (due to ψ < 0), the expression
(1−ηPd,yd)Pd−β must be negative. The increase in domestic output reduces the marginal cost
of producing foreign output due to complementarities in production; hence, foreign output
also increases.
On the other hand, an increase in the foreign tax rate, tf, increases the marginal cost of
domestic output by −ψy
j
f. The MNE responds to this by decreasing domestic output. This
also leads to a decrease in foreign output. An increase in the foreign proﬁt tax, tf, thus
results in a decrease of output in both markets.
2.2 Comparison across cases
Since the purpose of this paper is to examine how the presence of an MNE aﬀects the exchange
rate pass-through relative to AT, and how the MNE’s location of production matters for
exchange rate pass-through, we need to compare equilibria across the cases of AT when an
MNE is absent, and IT and IP when an MNE is present.
Proposition 4 Domestic and foreign output by an MNE is higher compared with AT, as-

















f , e ≤ 1 and e > 1 but not too large. (31)
If e < 1, both the MNE’s domestic and foreign outputs increase with a shift from IT to IP;
that is, yIP
i ≥ yIT
i , i = d,f. If e > 1, the reverse is true; that is, yIP
i ≤ yIT
i .
Proof: This can be easily shown by directly comparing y
j
i, for i ∈ {d,f}, j ∈ {AT,IT,IP}.
Q.E.D.
The intuition is as follows. When e < 1, the average marginal cost of the MNE falls with
IP and, therefore, output increases. This increase is true for both the domestic and foreign
markets due to the economies of scope the MNE enjoys. The opposite argument holds if
12e > 1.
Proposition 5 In response to an increase in the exchange rate, e, the MNE’s outputs in-
crease under IT while they decrease under IP
E
IT
yi,e < 0 < E
IP
yi,e, i ∈ {d,f}. (32)
Since ηPi,yi > 0, i ∈ {d,f}, market prices fall in response to an increase in the exchange
rate, EIT
Pi,e < 0 (i ∈ {d,f}), for an MNE with IT. On the other hand, under an MNE with
international production, market prices increase in response to an increase in the exchange
rate, EIP
Pi,e > 0, for i ∈ {d,f}.
Proof: The proof is relegated to Appendix F. Q.E.D.
The next proposition compares exchange rate pass-through under the diﬀerent cases of
an arm’s-length exporter, and MNE with IT and an MNE with IP.
Proposition 6 The exchange rate pass-through into domestic and foreign prices is incom-
plete under AT or an MNE; that is, |E
j
Pi,e| < 1, for i ∈ {d,f} and j ∈ {AT,IT,IP}.
Moreover,
(i) introducing an MNE increases the exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices and











for ψ < 0 but close to zero, where j ∈ {IT,IP} corresponds to the case with an MNE;






for i ∈ {d,f}, ψ < 0 but close to zero and e > β/(m + 2).
Proof: The proof is relegated to Appendix G. Q.E.D.
13Table 1: Comparison across cases
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yd,e
EIT










Table 1 summarizes the results in Propositions 4–6.
Proposition 6 shows that exchange rate pass-through is incomplete, |EAT
Pf,e| < 1, due to
imperfect competition, a common result in the standard industrial organization models of
exchange rate pass-through.
Proposition 6 implies that introducing an MNE (i) increases the exchange rate pass-
through into domestic prices and decreases the exchange rate pass-through into foreign prices,
and (ii) always causes pass-through to be higher under IT than under IP. The intuition is
as follows. An AT exporter’s domestic output is invariant to exchange rate changes and,
therefore, the exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices is zero under AT.8 This is
obvious from the ﬁrst-order condition (27) for ψ = 0. An MNE’s domestic output is, however,
aﬀected by exchange rate changes, because of linkages between the domestic and foreign
markets that arise from economies of scope; that is, ψ < 0. The exchange rate pass-through
into domestic prices is therefore positive in the presence of an MNE and, consequently, greater
than under AT. On the other hand, exchange rate pass-through into foreign prices is lower in
8This is an artifact of the assumption that there are no exporters based in the foreign country. Modifying
our model to allow for competition by other exporters will lead to a non-zero exchange rate pass-through
under AT, perhaps a more realistic scenario.
14the presence of an MNE than under AT, since the MNE is more “diversiﬁed” compared with
the AT exporter. An MNE adjusts both foreign and domestic production in response to an
exchange rate change due to linkages between the two markets that result from economies
of scope. We can easily see this from the ﬁrst-order conditions (27) and (28). A change
in the exchange rate, e, aﬀects the marginal revenue of producing for the foreign market,
and the MNE will adjust foreign output accordingly. This, in turn, aﬀects the marginal cost
of domestic production (that is, the left-hand side of (27)), and the MNE adjusts domestic
output as well. This is no longer the case for an arm’s-length exporter that adjusts only
its foreign output in response to a change in the exchange rate. Since the MNE has two
degrees of freedom, it does not have to adjust foreign output as much as the AT exporter.
The output adjustment is then passed through into prices via changes in the elasticity of
market demands with respect to output. This, in turn, renders foreign prices less sensitive
to exchange rate movements in the presence of an MNE compared with AT.
For part (ii) of Proposition 6, the intuition is as follows. Under IP, a change in the
exchange rate makes production in one market more expensive, and makes it less expensive
in the other market. These two eﬀects are oﬀsetting. Under IT, however, a change in the
exchange rate makes domestic production more or less expensive without an oﬀsetting eﬀect
in the foreign market. As a consequence, the MNE must adjust domestic output by a greater
extent under IT than under IP. The MNE is therefore more “diversiﬁed” under IP than under
IT, and output is less sensitive to exchange rate movements under IP than under IT. The
output adjustment translates into price adjustment via changes in the elasticity of market
demands with respect to output. As a result, IT prices are more sensitive to exchange rate
movement than their IP counterparts. Analytically, we can see this from the ﬁrst-order
conditions (27) and (28). Under IP, which corresponds to ψ < 0 and ε = e, a change in
the exchange rate, e, aﬀects both marginal revenue and marginal cost of foreign production
in (28), since we use the domestic currency as numeraire. Under IT, which corresponds to
ψ < 0 and ε = 1, a change in the exchange rate aﬀects only the marginal revenue of foreign
production in (28). The MNE must adjust foreign production more under IT than under IP
because there is no oﬀsetting marginal cost eﬀect.
To complete our analysis of how the presence of an MNE aﬀects exchange rate pass-
through, the following three propositions examine how exchange rate pass-through is aﬀected
by taxes, competition, and exchange rate movements. The results are obtained by taking
partial derivatives of pass-through elasticities and directly inspecting these derivatives.
15Proposition 7 Domestic taxes increase, and foreign taxes reduce, the exchange rate pass-
through in both domestic and foreign markets. Neither domestic nor foreign taxes aﬀect the














= 0, i,k ∈ {d,f}. (37)
Proposition 7 shows that domestic and foreign taxes have asymmetric eﬀects on exchange
rate pass-through. This result emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the
domestic and foreign markets when analyzing exchange rate pass-through.
Proposition 8 When the MNE’s domestic market becomes more competitive, exchange rate


















On the other hand, when the MNE’s foreign market becomes more competitive, exchange rate










< 0,j ∈ {AT,IT,IP}. (41)
Our results regarding the eﬀects of competition on exchange rate pass-through when an MNE
is present contrast with the results reported in the pricing-to-market literature on exchange
rate pass-through that features AT only and competition with other exporters in the domestic
market. In that literature, an increase in competition in the domestic market always increases
the sensitivity of domestic prices to exchange rate movements. In our context, the price
16sensitivity of a given market increases only in some cases, and, in those cases, always in
response to an increase in the competition the MNE faces in the other market.
Proposition 9 An appreciation/depreciation of the domestic currency leads to a de-





≤ 0, i ∈ {d,f}, j ∈ {AT,IT,IP}. (42)
3. Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a model that allows us to look at the eﬀects of MNEs’ pricing
behaviour on the sensitivity of prices to exchange rate movements. Our simple model allows
us to draw some powerful conclusions.
We ﬁrst ﬁnd that the exchange rate pass-through into domestic and foreign prices is
incomplete. We also show that IT domestic prices are more sensitive to exchange rate move-
ments than AT prices, whereas IT foreign prices are less sensitive to exchange rate movements
than AT prices. Moreover, IT domestic and foreign prices are more sensitive to exchange
rate movements than their IP counterparts.
Our results are consistent with some of the empirical evidence on exchange rate pass-
through. First, the empirical evidence is somewhat mixed with respect to the sensitivity of
IT prices to exchange rate movements compared with that of AT prices. Our results imply
that it is important to distinguish between the domestic market (that is, the location of the
MNE’s parent) and the foreign market (the location of the subsidiary) when looking at the
sensitivity of IT prices versus AT and IP prices. This could potentially explain why some
empirical studies ﬁnd IT prices more sensitive to exchange rate movements and others ﬁnd
them less sensitive.
Second, the empirical evidence shows that the exchange rate pass-through into U.S. im-
port prices is lower than into Canadian import prices. One explanation in our model could
be that foreign MNEs choose to deliver goods into the United States mainly by IP and into
Canada mainly by IT. This is, of course, something that would have to be tested empirically.
Our analysis also shows that exchange rate pass-through does not always increase with
competition, which is somewhat in contradiction with the pricing-to-market literature. The
17pricing-to-market literature, however, considers only arm’s-length exporters that produce at
constant marginal cost. This is not the case in our model of the MNE, which could explain
our mixed results.
In this paper, we abstract from intermediate production and assume that the MNE pro-
duces a homogeneous ﬁnal good for two locations. In order to better compare our results
with those in the standard industrial organization models of exchange rate pass-through, we
need to consider intermediate production in our future work. This is important, since an
increasing proportion of MNEs’ trade is accounted for by intermediate goods. Relaxing the
homogeneity assumption and introducing product diﬀerentiation would also allow us to look
explicitly at transfer prices. In our model, the MNE competes only with purely domestic
and foreign ﬁrms; we do not consider competition from exporters. Extending the analysis to
include competition from exporters is left for future research.
18References
Aw, B. and A. Hwang. 1995. “Productivity and the Export Market: A Firm-level Analysis.”
Journal of Development Economics 47(2): 313–32.
Bernard, A. and J. Jensen. 1995. “Exporters, Jobs, and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing,
1976–1987.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics. Washington DC.
———. 1997a. “Exporters, Skill-Upgrading, and the Wage Gap.” Journal of International
Economics 42: 3–31.
———. 1997b. “Inside the U.S. Export Boom.” National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 6438.
———. 1997c. “Why Some Firms Export: Experience, Entry Costs, Spillovers, and Subsi-
dies.” Yale University. Photocopy.
Bernard, A., J. Jensen, and J. Wagner. 1997. “The Good Go Abroad.” In The Evolution of
Firms and Industries, edited by S. Laarsonen. Helsinki: Statistics Finland.
Bernard, A. and J. Wagner. 1997. “Exports and Success in German Manufacturing.”
Weltwirtschaﬂiches Archiv 133(1): 134–57.
Bodnar, G.M., B. Dumas, and R.C. Marston. 2002. “Pass-Through and Exposure.” Journal
of Finance 57(1): 199–231.
Bond, E.W. and T.A. Gresik. 1996. “Regulation of Multinational Firms with Two Active
Governments: A Common Agency Approach.” Journal of Public Economics 59: 33–53.
Calzolari, G. 2004. “Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises.” International Eco-
nomic Review 45(1): 257–82.
Calzolari, G. and C. Scarpa. 2004. “Regulation at Home, Competition Abroad: A Theoretical
Framework.” Photocopy.
Clausing, K.A. 2001. “The Behavior of Intraﬁrm Trade Prices in U.S. International Price
Data.” Bureau of Labor Statistics Working Paper No. 333.
———. 2003. “Tax-Motivated Transfer Pricing and US Intraﬁrm Trade Prices.” Journal of
Public Economics 87: 2207–23.
Dasgupta, S. and K. Sengupta. 1995. “Optimal Regulation of MNEs and Government Rev-
enues.” Journal of Public Economics 58: 215–34.
19Desai, M.A., C.F. Foley, and J.R.J. Hines. 2005. “Foreign Direct Investment and the Domestic
Capital Stock.” American Economic Review 95(2): 33–8. Papers and Proceedings.
Dornbusch, R. 1987. “Exchange Rate and Prices.” American Economic Review 77(1): 93–
106.
Eden, L. 1998. Taxing Multinationals: Transfer Pricing and Corporate Income Taxation in
North America. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Feenstra, R.C., J.E. Gagnon, and M.M. Knetter. 1996. “Market Share and Exchange Rate
Pass-Through in World Automobile Trade.” Journal of International Economics 40: 187–
207.
Gresik, T.A. and D.R. Nelson. 1994. “Incentive Compatible Regulation of a Foreign-Owned
Subsidiary.” Journal of International Economics 36: 309–31.
Hegji, C.E. 2003. “A Note on Transfer Prices and Exchange Rate Pass-Through.” Journal
of Economics and Finance 27(3): 396–403.
Lapham, B. 2004. “Canadian Restructuring and Exchange Rate Pass-Through.” Queen’s
University. Photocopy.
Markusen, J.R. 1984. “Multinationals, Multi-Plant Economies, and the Gains from Trade.”
Journal of International Economics 16: 205–26.
Pain, N. 2002. “Networks, Multinational Firms and U.K. Export Performance.” National
Institute for Economic and Social Research. Photocopy.
Rangan, S. 2001. “Explaining Tranquility in the Midst of Turbulence: U.S. Multinationals’
Intraﬁrm Trade, 1966–1997.” Bureau of Labor Statistics Working Paper No. 336.
Rangan, S. and R.Z. Lawrence. 1999. “Search and Deliberation in International Exchange:
Learning from Multinational Trade about Lags, Distance Eﬀects, and Home Bias.” NBER
Working Paper No. 7012.
Richardson, J. and K. Rindal. 1995. Why Exports Really Matter! Washington D.C: The
Institute for International Economics and the Manufacturing Institute.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 1998–2004. World In-
vestment Report. New York: United Nations Program on Transnational Corporations.
20Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Using Pd = a − bYd, Pf = h − kYf, Yd = yd + ny−d, and Yf = yf + my−f in the ﬁrst-order conditions (9)
and (10), we obtain:
byd + b(n + 1)y−d = a − 1, (A.1)
kyf + k(m + 1)y−f = h − 1. (A.2)
Equations (A.1) and (A.2) can be solved for y−d and y−f in terms of yd and yf, respectively. The solutions
give (11). Substituting (11) into the domestic and foreign aggregate output gives (12).
21Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1






















= Eyi,e · ηPi,yi.
(B.1)
22Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 2







Since Pd = −b and Pf = −k, we can use (12) to obtain the result shown in Lemma 2.
23Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 3
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the MNE’s domestic output, (7), can be rewritten as:









































which proves (19). The proof for (20) is similar. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the MNE’s foreign
output, (8), can be rewritten as:
e
h + m − k(m + 2)yf
m + 1
= βε + ψyd. (D.4)
Diﬀerentiating both sides of (D.4) with respect to yf, multiplying both sides by e/yf, and rearranging terms
gives (20).
24Appendix E: Equilibrium Quantities and Prices
Solving equations (7)–(10) yd, y−d, yf, and y−f using the expressions in Lemma 1, we obtain:














































































for j ∈ {IT,IP}, where D ≡ (1 − td)ekb(n + 2)(m + 2) − (1 − tf)ψ2(n + 1)(m + 1) > 0.
25Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 5





















We can easily derive the elasticities of the foreign outputs with respect to the exchange rate under IT














∆IT = D(1 − td)(n + 2)b(h + m) − DyIT
f (1 − td)(n + 2)(m + 2)kb > 0, (F.4)
∆IP = D(1 − td)(n + 2)b[(h + m) − (m + 1)β] − DyIP
f (1 − td)(n + 2)(m + 2)kb < 0, (F.5)
for ψ close to zero. This implies that EIT
yf,e < EIP
yf,e for ψ close to zero.
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{(1 − tf)ψ2(m + 1)[a + n − (n + 1)PIT





(1 − tf)ψ2(m + 1)[a + n − (n + 1)PIP
d ]. (G.2)
Since, EIT
Pd,e < 0 and EIP
Pd,e > 0, we compute the diﬀerence between the absolute value of EIT
Pd,e and
EIP







(1 − tf)ψ(m + 1)[bβ + 2ψ(a + n) − ψ(n + 1)(PIT
d − PIP
d )]. (G.3)
For ψ close to zero, the left-hand side of (G.3) is positive and, therefore, |EIT
Pd,e| > EIP
Pd,e > 0 = EAT
Pd,e.
In order to show that the exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices is incomplete under both
IT and IP, it is enough to show that |EIT
Pd,e| < 1. For ψ close to zero:
|EIT
Pd,e| − 1 =
1
De
{(1 − tf)ψ2(m + 1)[a + n − (n + 1)PIT
d ] − (1 − tf)bβ(m + 1)
− (1 − td)e2kb(n + 2)(m + 2) + (1 − tf)eψ2(n + 1)(m + 1)} < 0.
(G.4)
















{(1 − tf)ψ2(n + 1)[h + m − (m + 1)PIP
f ] − (1 − td)ψk[a + n − β(n + 1)]} > 0, (G.7)
for ψ close to zero. We can show that foreign prices are more sensitive to exchange rate movements
under AT than under IT by calculating the diﬀerence, |EAT
Pf,e| − |EIT






ψ{(1 − tf)ψ(n + 1)[h + m − (m + 1)PIT
f ]
− (1 − td)k[a + n − β(n + 1)] −
1
DDAT ψ(n + 1)(m + 1)} > 0,
(G.8)






{(1 − tf)ψ2(n + 1)(m + 1)(PIT
f − PIP
f ) − 2(1 − tf)ψ2(n + 1)(h + m)
+ 2(1 − td)kψ[a + n − β(n + 1)] + (1 − td)bkβ(n + 2)} > 0,
(G.9)
for ψ close to zero.
27So far, we have shown that EIP
Pf,e < |EIT
Pf,e| < |EAT
Pf,e| for ψ suﬃciently close to zero. Since
|EAT
Pf,e| − 1 =
1
De
(1 − td)kb(n + 2)[β − e(m + 2)] < 0, (G.10)
for e > β/(m + 2), it follows that the exchange rate pass-through into foreign prices is incomplete
under AT, IT, and IP.
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